Buffalo Law Review
Volume 3

Number 2

Article 25

4-1-1954

Advance to Barbarism—How the Reversion to Barbarism in
Warfare and War-Trials Menaces Our Future. By F. J. P. Veale.
Richard Arens
University at Buffalo School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard Arens, Advance to Barbarism—How the Reversion to Barbarism in Warfare and War-Trials
Menaces Our Future. By F. J. P. Veale., 3 Buff. L. Rev. 340 (1954).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol3/iss2/25

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
cisms. It should have a place in all libraries and Legal Aid Societies as illustrative of a monumental effort and high achievement attained by certain members of the Bar. It shows a substantial contribution to better community life and the improvement of the fare of that little man in the street. As Judge Albert
Conway so well said, "All right-thinking men agree that a person
requiring the advice or assistance of a lawyer should receive it
whether or not he can afford it; that it is as necessary as that
he have the services of a physician when ill, and that a grievance
against the administration of justice can do more social
harm
2
'
than suffering on account of lack of hospital facilities."
Elmer C. Miller
Attorney and Counsel
Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo
ADVANCE TO BARBARISM-HOW THE REvEmsiol To BRBA ISM Ix
WAR-TRAis MEzTAcEs OuR FUTurE By F. J. P.
Veale. Appleton, Wis.: C. C. Nelson. 1953. Pp. xvii, 305. $4.50
WARFARE AN

L
This is at the same time both a tedious and a provocative
attempt at the indictment of the Western Alliance of World War
II for the "crimes" of "uncivilized" warfare and the subsequent
"mock trials" of Nuremberg. It is based upon a 'trend analysis"
descriptive of a "reversion to barbarism in warfare and wartrials," and predictive of a continued advance of barbarism
throughout the length and breadth of the world community.
The author, F. J. P. Veale, is identified by his publishers as
"4n able English lawyer with . . .a competent command of the
facts of military history . . .and high humanitarian principles."
His method is described as that of "tracing the gradual 'civilizing' of warfare from the days when men of the glacial periods
and stone age exterminated all their enemies to the introduction
of humanitarian principles and procedure during the Age of
Reason, [then revealing] with terrifying completeness and candor
the manner in which we have reverted to the attitudes and practices of primitives, . . . [showing] plainly that the spirtual ante-

cedents and cultural affinities of the war-crimes trials are to be
found in (1) the torturing of captive wild beasts by primitive
men; (2) the practices of savages who killed off their captured
enemies . . .; (3) -the collecting of the heads of vanquished
enemies by primitives . . .; (4) the systematic Tartar slaughter

of captured armies and civilian population, and (5) Marxian

political biology and juristic euthanasia .

.

."

His purpose
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is set out as showing the "dire portent" of this "reversion" for
the future--" and perhaps (a) not too distant future . . . [in
which] nothing, however horrible . . . [will] be held back" by
any "civilizing" restraints. In this context the pronouncement
of doom and destruction is put forward with the implicit assurance of the scientific seriousness attributable to an expectation
".. . [resting] upon the extrapolation of past trends into the
future" and hence set up as "a construct that is frankly imaginative though disciplined by careful consideration of the past."'
One must inquire at starting, therefore, as to the degree to which
the author's "frankly imaginative construct" is "disciplined by
careful consideration of the past."
II.
F. J. P. Veale initiates his "study" by a portrayal of
"primeval simplicity" in which the "enemy" represented, e. g.,
by a hated tiger or bear was upon capture "first reduced to complete helplessness by being deprived of food and . . . [was] then
mocked, baited to frenzy, terrified by fireworks, and finally fin-2
ished off in a slow and painful manner amid general rejoicings."
The inference which is then pressed on the reader as inescapable,
is that "if the men of the Stone Age were accustomed to deal with
animal enemies in this way, . . . it [is] . . . probable that, on
occasion, they dealt with particularly feared and hated human
enemies in the same way." 3 The conclusion which "follows"
directly from "the above reasoning" according to the author, is
that "the practice of mock-trials recently introduced solemnly as
an epoch-making innovation is nothing but a revival of a practice
so long abandoned by civilized peoples that its origin in the remote
past has become forgotten." 4
Having laid this foundation, the author proceeds to a
differentiation of "primary warfare, that is warfare between
combatants at different stages of civilization" and "secondary
warfare," that is warfare "between combatants at the same or
approximately the same stage of civilization." Included in the
"all the wars
latter categorization are all civil wars: in fact,
5
in this division are in essence only civil wars."
"History" is then rapidly sketched for maximum diffusion
A seemingly Nordic "Herrenvolk" is porof "enlightenment."
trayed as bringing about a gradual "civilizing" of warfare. This
1. LASSWELL, THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR 147 (1947).
2. VEALE, ADVANCE To BASm. sm 14 (1953).

3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Id. at 23.

341

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
is characterized by the humanization of the treatment of the captive and the exclusion of the non-combatant from the scope of
belligerent operations. The author recounts that in the Middle
Ages, "Whatever his nationality, the European knight professed
the code of the Christian warrior. With his reputation as such
to maintain, a European knight could not afford to use the capture
of a prisoner of the same class as himself as an opportunity to
indulge his resentment against a helpless enemy either in the
manner of an Assyrian King, by flaying or impalement, or, in the
present-day manner, by a mock-trial followed by hanging.10
By the eighteenth century an operative belligerent code had
come to be "based on one simple principle, namely that warfare
should be the concern only of the armed combatants engaged . . .
[N]on-combatants should be left entirely outside the scope of
military operations."'
Veale contends that the World War II repudiation of his
fundamental principle of civilized warfare, i. e. the "exclusion
of non-combatants from the scope of hostilities" is primarily
attributable to the British government. "It is one of the greatest
triumphs of modern emotional engineering," he claims, "Ithat . . .
the British public, throughout the Blitz Period (1940-1941), remaimed convinced that the entire responsibility for the sufferings
which it was undergoing rested on the German leaders." 8 Veale
knows better. The major responsibility for these sufferings, he
declaims, rested on the British government. He recalls that on
May 11, 1940 (at the height of the Nazi invasion of France and
the Low Countries) the British Air Ministry revealed its
"splendid decision" to engage in the massive bombing of population centers, by ordering eighteen R. A. F. bombers "to drop
their bombs when they found themselves over western Germany
in the hope that some of them might land on railway installations. '"9 He maintains that it was this act and this act alone
which furnished the precedent for all subsequent acts of "uncivilized" warfare; in so doing he specifically exonerates the Nazis
from all charges of acts of "uncivilized" warfare until that time.
He goes on to assert that notwithstanding the enormity of this
act of British provocation the "whole structure of civilized warfare as it had been gradually built up in Europe during the
preceding two centuries"' 1 might still have been maintained, had
it not been for a further act of insular truculence encompassed,
this time, by greeting Hitler's peace overtures after the fall of
6. Id. at 59-60.
7. Id. at 65-66.
8. Id. at 120.
9. Id. at 122.
10. Id. at 128.
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France with "sulky silence."' 1 The Nazis, at this tide of their
affairs, are pictured as in too generous a mood "to set about paying off old scores.' 2 The author perceives no inconsistency between such a "mood" and this well-known incident of the French
defeat which he describes with apparent approval. Hitler, he recalls, "[w] ith his highly developed sense of historical fitness . . .
insisted that the famous railway coach in the Forest of Compi~gne,
in which Marshal Foch had dictated terms of surrender
should be the scene of surrender of the Army which Foch had then
led to victory."' 3
To its remaining enemies, the Third Reich offered an enticing
peace.' 4
It was only when the proffered hand of friendship was rebuffed in "sulky silence" that the "splendid decision" became
the effective cause in opening the floodgates of barbaric warfare.
The author appears to hint at the discovery of another
possibility of Anglo-German reconciliation, presumably in the
context of the Nazi-Soviet war. Without significant elaboration
as to the origins of the new struggle, he blithely pictures Nazi
Germany as responding to the Soviet threat "under the shadow
of the Red Army." 5 In the ensuing war, a war which exemplifies
the author's concept of "primary warfare," i. e. "warfare between combatants at different stages of civilization" and hence
productive of the neglect of chivalry, the Nazi armies appear as
the standard bearers of occidental civilization. An undisclosed
kind of Nazi ruthlessness is deemed justified under the circumstances. Veale approvingly quotes Field Marshal Keitel in justification of the "necessity" of the Nazi measures of warfareagainst Russia-"Hier handelt es sich um die Vernichtung einer
Weltanschauung (. .. 'it involves the destruction of the whole
life philosophy of one side or the other')."' 6
He pours his contempt upon the response of Western leadership to the demands of the developing crisis. So far from comprehending the logic of the historical process that impelled the
Nazis into Russian steppes as champions of Western civilization,
the Western Allies acted as though the Nazis manifested a con11. Id. at 119.
12. Id. at 116.
13. Ibid.
14. Id. at 119: "Hitler's solution . . . was an offer to negotiate peace. We
need not consider whether this offer was sincere, since any other course from his point
of view would have been madness. He had achieved all and much more than all he
had set out to achieve . .
15. Ibid.
16. Id. at 128-129; cf. Jessup, International Law and Totalitarian War, 35 AM. J.
INT'. L. 329 (1951).
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crete threat to their existence as well as their way of life. They
thus proceeded to drop an increasing quantum of explosive tonnage over Germany in pursuance of "the splendid decision" of
May 11, 1940 and in violation of Veale's canons of civilized warfare.17

The flood-gates of barbarism were wide open.

Veale

hastens to note in this connection that henceforth the evolving
barbarity was attributable not only to the cynicism of the British
war lords or the inevitable savagery of "primary warfare" with
the Soviet Union, but equally to what he diagnoses as American
barbarity. The very participation in the war by the United States,
is stigmatized as the product of the Machiavellian leadership of
Franklin Roosevelt, who as a matter of domestic economic necessity, provoked the Axis into war by acts of unilateral intervention.' 8 Beyond that, American barbarity in battle is attributed to
the fact that the United States, as a non-European power lacked
the restraints of a tradition of "civilized" warfare and had, in
fact, already manifested a "reversion to primary or total warfare" in the Civil War. 9 The nadir of Allied villainy, however,
was not reached until the conclusion of hostilities. This was
signalized by the institution of the "mock trials" of Nuremberg.
As viewed by the author the crown of thorns was thrust upon the
Nazi leadership when, bowed in defeat, it was arraigned before
the International Military Tribunal for what was in effect no
worse a crime than being on the losing side. The war crimes
trials are thus deemed to establish nothing more significant than
the primitive law of vengeance: "Being on the losing side is the
supreme international crime, differing only from other war crimes
in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the

whole." ' 20 The trials themselves are indicted as indistinguishable
from proceedings of the G. P. U. 21 The hanging of "distinguished

prisoners of war" is "diagnosed" as "the culmination of a movement . . . noteworthy because it was a complete reversal of the

-[civilizing] trend which, with
periodic fluctuations, had been going
22
on since prehistoric times."

The inevitable conclusion to be drawn by civilized men under
such circumstances should, of course, be in line with the author's
declared preference, to wit that the23 Nuremberg judgment was a
"reversion to primitive practice."

17. VEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 129.
at 273-274; cf. HAcm, THE UNITED STATES IN THE 20TH CENTURY

18. Id.

(1952).
19. VEAE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 89; see also id. at 90-94, 138-146.
20. Id. at 177.
21. Id. at 179.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Id. at 4.
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Veale then formally proceeds to setting up the "construct"
of the triumph of barbarism as his imaginative projection of the
contemporary "trends" in warfare and in war crimes trials. Unless reversed and repudiated, he inveighs, the emerging contemporary trend toward barbarism will submerge the remaining moral
and material values of the West. The Nuremberg trials, he concludes, "made it inevitable that all the restraints which still
survived the second World War would be thrown to the winds in
the third . . . Since nothing worse can happen to a national war
leader than to be disgraced, tortured and hanged, if defeated,
there is no logical or psychological reason, for failing to throw
in everything which may promise victory, however lethal and
barbarous . . . In this way, a juridical procedure, which was
designed to discourage war-time brutalities, has resulted in assuring war-time horror, beyond all precedent, and in removing every
restraint on such action. Moreover, the war-trials
24 and punishments have failed utterly to discourage warfare.,
HIL.
Devious logic and shallow analysis provide the sole support
to the unfolding presentation, compounded as it is of transparent
half-truth and outright fiction. Since any rational and objective
examination of its structure should bring about the collapse of its
argument under its own weight, Advance to Barbarism,would not
normally merit any attempt at a formal refutation. The abnormality of the times, however, is highlighted by the explicit need
of all possible attempts in this direction. Today, fears of atomic
war have produced a defensive appeasement of the Germans. A
defensive appeasement of the Germans has in turn produced a
pathetic eagerness to acquiesce in the exoneration of our newfound Allies from the taint of Nazi war crimes. In catering to the
emerging emotional need of a "white-wash" by a "re-writing of
history" in the tradition of the Communist and Nazi ideologies,
Veale's effectiveness hinges primarily upon emotional rather than
intellectual factors.
While we must assume that what "people will pay attention
to and how they will act is determined in large measure by what
they start with in the way of basic predispositions, beliefs, attitudes, biases and unconscious motivations,"125 we can equally assume that "men's attitudes on questions of war and peace can
be altered through information which is communicated to their
minds" ' 26 on a conscious level.
24. Id. at 294; cf. JEssuP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 157-187 (1950) ; Meltzer,
A Note Ot Somne Aspects of the Nuremberg Debate, 14 U. OF CHi. L. REV. 455 (1947).
25. DUNN, WAR AND TIE MINDS OF MEN, 47 (1950).

26. Id. at 82.
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What then, are some of the significant facts of the recent
past, in their bearing upon the thesis propounded by F. J. P.
Veale's Advance to Barbarism?
Formal, detailed and rationally unimpeachable refutation of
Veale's thesis has been provided by Drexel A. Sprecher, formerly
Deputy Chief Counsel of the Office of 27the United States Chief of
Counsel of War Crimes at Nuremberg.
Highlights of all too recent history, however, bear repetition
at a time like ours.
The wantonness and deliberation of Nazi aerial strafing of
civilian refugees upon French roads in the conquest of France
in 1940 provided a startled world with Germany's unmistakable
notice of the adoption of a hitherto unknown strategy of "total
war,"I2 long before the taking of any alleged "splendid decision"I
by Britain. In short order a pattern of Nazi war crimes began
to unfold in pursuance of a rationally determinable design
strangely reminiscent of that attributable by Veale to the Allies,
but established beyond reasonable doubt as the product of Nazi
leadership:
War Crimes were committed on a vast scale, never before seen in the history of war. They were perpetrated in all
countries occupied by Germany, and on the High Seas, and were

attended by every conceivable circumstance of cruelty and liorror. There can be no doubt that the majority of them arose
from the Nazi conception of 'total war'

.

.

.

For in this con-

ception of 'total war', the moral ideas underlying the conventions
which seek to make war more humane are no longer regarded
as having force or validity. Everything is made subordinate
to the over-mastering dictates of war. Rules, . . . treaties
all alike are of no moment; and so, freed from the restraining
influence of international law, the aggressive2 war is conducted
by the Nazi leaders in the most barbaric way. 9

A calloused world must be reminded that the Nazi methods
of "total war", outside of the physical extermination of 6,000,000
Jewish men, women and children, 0 encompassed such character27. Sprecher, Book Review, 14 LA. L. REv. 447 (1954).
A concise historical
survey of the war at large is provided by COMMAGER, THz STORY OF TE SECOND WORLD
WAR (1945).
28. See, e.g., MILLER, HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II 219 (1948) ; cf. LESKE, I WAS
A NAZI FLIER (1941), chapter entitled "Why Not Bomb Civilians" at 25-34. See also
SCHULTZ, GERMANY WILL TRY IT AGAIN (1944) ; e. g., id. at 185: "The war had barely
started when we began hearing . . . about the crimes committed by the black-uniformed
Schutzstaffel in Poland, in the wake of the regular army."
29. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRrMINALS 226-227 (1947).
30. See 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 491-496 (1948); see also Turlington, The Genocide Convention Should Be Ratified, A. B. A., SEcTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATnE LAW, PROCEEDINGS 26 (1949); Lemkin, The U. N. Genocide
Convention, 95 CONG. REc. A 1224 (1949).
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istic behavior patterns as e.g. the 1944 shooting, upon recapture,
of fifty RAF officers who escaped from a prisoner camp ("Their
bodies were immediately cremated, and the urns containing their
ashes were returned to the camp");31 the issuance of the 1941
order that ". . . [the] Bolshevist soldier . . . has lost all claim
to treatment . . . in accordance with the Geneva Convention;" 2
the consequent enforcement of starvation diets for these prisoners ;83 and their occasional branding "with a special permanent
mark" ("The brand is to take the shape of an acute angle of
about 45 degrees, with the long side to be 1 cm in length, pointing
upwards and burnt on the left buttock . . . ;34 the establishment of a system of compulsory deportation from occupied territories, described by Rimmler as including, e.g., in Poland the
" . . [hauling] away of thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds
of thousands" of human beings in "weather 40 degrees below
zero"; 85 the promulgation of the 1941 Night & Fog Decree, "under which persons who committed offenses against the Reich or
the German forces in occupied territories, except where the death
sentence was certain, were to be taken secretly to Germany and
handed over to the SIPO for trial and punishment in Germany
. . . After these civilians arrived in Germany, no word of them
was permitted to reach the country from which they came, or
their relatives; even in cases when they died awaiting trial the
families were not informed, the purpose being to create anxiety
in the minds of the family of the arrested person." 6
Perhaps the most serious crime committed by the Nazi regime was directed against the German population itself. It has
thus been noted that "there was a widespread release of destructive drives . . . in the German people under the Nazi regime"
and that the "ego structure" of the "people bred and integrated
into the German social-cultural system" (who are to be our
Allies in EDO) has been characterized by "a resentment of and
"attitude of the paranoid
a denial of reality" comparable to 3 the
7
individual in reference to reality."
31. 1 TRIAL OF
32. Ibid.
33. Id. at 231.

THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 229.

34. Ibid.; see also 10 TRIALS

OF

WAR CRIMINALS 1054-1055 (1951).

35. 1 TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 244.
36. Id. at 232-233. For complete official translation of the decree see, 11 TRIALs
OF WAR CRIMINALs 196-197 (1950).
37. See Alexander, The Molding of Personality Under Dictatorship, 40 J. CRIM.
L. AND CRIMINOL. 3, 16-19 (1949).
For a somewhat clearer analogy to primitive culture than that furnished
by F. J. P. Veale, the reader may wish to consult Sigmund Freud's The
Totemic Feast, reproduced in MEAD AND CALAS, PRIMITIVE HERITAGE, AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL SURVEy 22-26 (1953).
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One must add in conclusion that these Nazi crimes were
proved in the course of a prosecution marked by a high degree of
procedural safeguards for the defense and unique in the history of
criminal trials, if for no other reason than that it deliberately
refused to offer in evidence the confessions of the accused, and
relied, instead, upon the introduction of independent material
evidence under exacting standards of proof:
Much of the evidence presented to the Tribunal on behalf of the
Prosecution was documentary evidence, captured by the Allied
armies in German army headquarters, government buildings, and
elsewhere. Some of the documents were found in salt mines,

buried in the ground, hidden behind false walls and in other

places thought to be secure from discovery. The case, therefore,
against the defendants rests in a large measure on documents
of their own making, the authenticity of which has not been
challenged except in one or two cases.3 (Emphasis added)

We can cast aside, at this stage, consideration of the controversy of the retroactive application of the law of Aggressive
War. Since the author appears predominantly concerned with the
"trend" in warfare exemplified by the brutalization of ordinary
war crimes, it suffices to note that, in this context, no defendant
was hanged without being proved guilty of ordinary gardenvariety murder, in these cases multiplied a one hundred or onemillion fold. In the area of the traditional war-crimes it can
therefore be fairly asserted that throughout the program of
Nuremberg war crimes prosecution, the tribunals erred, if at
all, upon the side of leniency to the accused. Three individual
defendants and several indicted organizations were acquitted
despite formidable proof of connection with the criminal enterprise in the first trial.3 9 The pattern of the remaining twelve
Nuremberg trials has been best summarized by Drexel A.
Sprecher:
38. 1 TRiAL. OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 173 (1947); ef. JACKSON, THE NUREMviii (1947).
See also Leventhal, Harris, Woolsey, Farr, The Nuremburg
Verdict, 60 HARv. L. REv. 857, 860 (1947) ;
The several thousand documents ultimately introduced by the prosecution
were the distillate of an estimated 100,000 screened by British and American
teams-the vast majority captured from German sources. The documentary
case which resulted was, therefore, impressive. The defendants themselves
showed great respect for the captured documents and helped to authenticate
important papers whose place of capture was unknown.
See also Terencz, Nuremberg Trial Procedure and the Rights of the Accused, 39
BUTRG CASE

J. CRIM. L. AND CIGIINIOL. 144 (1948).
39. See, e.g., 1 TarAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

307-310, 325-327, 336-338.
Cf. discussion of acquittals of war crimes on a lower Allied level in Arens, Nuremberg
and Group Prosecution, 1951 WASH. U. L. Q. 329 (1951). See also generally, Franklin,
Sources of InternationalLaw Relating to Sanctions Against War Criminals, 36 J. CRIer.

L. AND CRIMINOL.

153 (1945).
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In this . . . group of trials 177 persons stood trial. Of
these 142 were convicted on one or more counts; 35 were ac-

quitted on all counts. Of the 142 convicted, 26 were originally
sentenced to death, 20 to life imprisonment, and 98 to a term of

years. Sixteen were sentenced to a term of less than four years,

and 11 of these were released immediately after judgment by

virtue of 'credit' for the time spent already in confinement be-

fore and during the trial. In the two exclusively 'military'
trials, in which twenty-two generals and one admiral were tried,
to death, and four were
none of the
4 0 defendants were sentenced

acquitted.
This description of the emerging pattern of leniency cannot
be considered complete without mention of the numerous sweeping amnesties, decreed by the Western Allied administrations and
in the release of most of the war criminals under senresulting
4
tence. '
If judicial and administrative concern for the rights of the
defendants in criminal litigation is to stand as the test of fairness and rationality one can but endorse the conclusion drawn by
Drexel A. Sprecher, to wit, that "the danger of future war crimes
trials of victors over vanquished is not that the precedents of42
Nuremberg will be followed but that they will not be followed."
But any attempt at rational analysis is quixotic if it is designed to overcome the subjective obstacle of emotional predisposition in favor of the Nazi cause and Nazi leadership-even if such
a predisposition is rationalized in terms of a preferred policy of
"chivalrous" forbearance toward the conquered foe as the only
43
effective bar against the progressive brutalization of warfare.

IV.
It is clearly useless to pursue an examination of the "reversion to barbarism" as a trend in warfare and in war crimes trials
any further upon the basis of the materials of the book.
It may be helpful, however, to attempt to verify the allegation of existing trends, independently of causation, in terms of
an independent and rational trend analysis of our own. It is fitting that we inquire into the respect practices productive of
patterns of individual rights under the impact of warfare in
conditions of increasing industrialization, even if we are prodded
into such an inquiry by the vituperation of F. J. P. Veale.
40. Sprecher, supra note 27 at 447, 466.
41. See, e.g., Arens, Book Review, 62 YALE L. J. 1274 (1953).
42. Sprecher, supra note 27 at 447, 467.
43. See, e.g., Franklin, Book Review, 27 S. CAL. L. REv. 232, 234 (1954) : "With
respect to the . . . [altemative-to let the German leaders go free-there is much
language in Advance to Barbarism to suggest that the author is sympathetic to this

idea."
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We may well note on a world-wide level that the creation of
respect standards, productive of expanding "human rights" in
the context of the "myth" of civil justice, has been paralleled by
the creation of respect standards, destructive of "human rights"
in the context of the "technique" of increasing garrison-state
government.44
The rise of the mass armies of the nation state since the
French Revolution has tended to the progressive subjection of
ever larger segments of the civilian population to some form of
military rule. The individual had thus barely emancipated himself from the constraints of rigid feudal pyramidal stratification
to find himself in the confinement of a comparable hierarchical
structure established by the national war machine. As the size
and number of armies continued to grow, ever larger segments
of the national populace were drawn into the scope of effective
military control. The growth of national military power thus
cast its shadow upon the entire industrial world: "the size of
armies has tended to increase during the modern period both
absolutely and in proportion to the population."
A consequence
of such an expansion has been that beyond the increasing absorption of civilians in the overt military establishment, "the bulk
of the population . . [has been] mobilized for some war work,"40
in increasing degree. Militarization of all national life under such
circumstances has become an established trend:
Where formerly 1 per cent of the population was a large
number to mobilize, now over 10 per cent can be mobilized, of
which a quarter may be at the front at one time. But 10 per

cent mobilized requires most of the remaining adult population

to provide them with the essentials of continuing operations.

Thus instead of 1 per cent engaging in war and the rest pursuing their peacetime occupations of trade or agriculture, now
the entire working4population must devote itself to direct or indirect war service. 7

Paralleling the militarization of national life is the "nationalization of the war effort," i.e., "the extension of government
44. See, e.g., Lasswell, The Interrelations of World Organization and Society,
55 YALE L. J. 889 (1946). The words "myth" and "technique" are, of course, used
in the technical sense of the contemporary social sciences. See, e.g., McDouGAL AND

LASSWELL, THE WORLD COMMUNITY AND LAW: A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

5 (Yale Law School mimeographed materials, 1953) ;
In studying culture a distinction is drawn between myth and technique.
The practices which comprise an institution include perspectives and
operations. (A voting practice has, for example, expectations about marking ballots, and a routine of marking.) All the perspectives are the myth;
all operations are the technique.
Cf. generally MvfcIvrR, WER OF GoVERNMENT c. 1 (1947).
45. 1 WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 232 (1951).
46. Id. at 234.
47. Id. at 304-305.
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4
into the control of economy and public opinion." 8 It is not un-

fair under these circumstances to conclude that "the military
state has tended to become the totalitarian state"4' 9 and that to
it the individual, whether soldier or civilian has increasingly surrendered his identity and thus forfeited the last claims to individualized consideration: "The moral identification of the indithe national will priority over
vidual with the state has given
5
humanitarian considerations. " °
It is not surprising, under the circumstances, that the continued rejection of "humanitarian considerations" and the consequent "exclusion of non-combatants from the scope of hostilities" as complained of by Veale5 ' should in part be reflected by
the statistical trend toward the increasing geographical scope of
wars coupled with the increased destructiveness of belligerent
operations.
Quincy Wright's analysis of 126 major wars fought between
1475-1940 brings out the following facts with reference to the
number of participating belligerent sovereignties: ".

. . the 42

[wars] which began in the late fifteenth and in the sixteenth
centuries averaged 2.4 participants each; the 19 which began in
the eighteenth century averaged 4.8 participants each; the 32
which began in the nineteenth century averaged 3.1 participants
each; and the 11 which began in the twentieth century averaged
5.6 participants each. Thus, apart from the nineteenth century,
in which there was a large number of imperial and civil wars,
was toward an increase in the number of particithe trend
52
pants. "

An increase in the number of both military and civilian casualties must also be noted. Sorokin's studies, concluded before
World War HI casualty rates had become available, showed the
increase in casualties exacted by the principal European wars
over nine centuries by the following index figures :
48. Id. at 306.
49. Ibid.
50. Id. at 307.
51. VALE,op. cit. supra note 2 at 128.
52. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 45 at 238.
53. See 3 SoRoXIN, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DYNAmiCS 340, 345. 349 as presented

by WRIGHT, A STUDY or LAW 656. See also id. at 236-237;
A third trend has been toward an increase in the length of battles, in
the number of battles in a war year, and also in the total number of battles
during a century . . . The intensity of war, measured by frequency and
duration of battles has certainly increased.
This conclusion is confirmed by Sorokin, who has compared by centuries
the number of wars weighted to take account of duration of war, size of
fighting force, number of casualties, number of countries involved and proportion of combatants to total population. His indices for the principal
European wars during the last nine centuries are:
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The process of the progressive extinction of varying forms
of individual identity in an increasingly industrialized world in
and beyond the field of military organization has been rendered
with refreshing vigor by Tibor Mende:
The spreading net of complex industrial society has caught
up the citizen in the meshes of unexpected dangers and involuntary obligations from which only the remotest areas, like Tibet,
the highlands of Peru, or some tribal areas of Africa, have so
far, escaped. But, wherever the net has been spread, the individual has had less and less chance to stand up alone against
the new forces of organization. Attempting to control an increasingly uncontrollable social environment, he has been driven
to collective action. He became a voter, a trade unionist, a
member of trade associations, a beneficiary of health or resettlement schemes, or one living on unemployment aid. Once decisions made at the top could influence the destinies of millions,
his automatic response was to merge his interests with other
millions in order to improve his chances of influencing those
decisions .
Step by step, the more technologically developed the community became, the more the individual was relegated to the role of
a cog in a machine whose tempo and purpose, increasingly escaped his control .
The persuasion, or influence, of people's thinking has gradually given way to the direction of their thoughts. Direction of
thought has led to the calculated curtailment of the field of
permissible ideas. Finally, the curtailment of the field of
thoughts and ideas has been completed by the latest, and most
terrifying, of techniques; the power of indoctrination to place
selected groups of individuals beyond the bounds of compassion .
Modern society has progressed with breath-taking speed from
the smashing of window-panes to the cremation alive of ideological rivals. We have descended, to varying depths, a long
ladder of spiritual degradation. At the topmost rung, there
was no more than the production of a general level of conform-
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ity. Further down, came new orthodoxies from which dissent
meant peril. These were followed by dictatorial methods, rewarding mediocrity and silencing creative talent . . .; finally,
at the bottom rung, came the infernal perfection of techniques

to create morbid humility and to promote it to the highest virtue, to breed abject and morally crippled individuals, and to
weld them into a centrally manipulated instrument of a fanatical society.
By today, the vulture of forced conformity is hovering over

mid-century humanity. 54

V
The enhanced danger to the maintenance of the physical and
moral integrity of the individual, created by the twin trends of
the increasing scope of belligerent destructiveness and the increasing "Gleichschaltung" of men as cogs in the machinery of
government must give us pause.
A sharpening bipolar rivalry between the garrison-prison
state of the East and the relatively free society of the West has
already produced such consequences as the tightening of the existing garrison-prison state of the East and the occasional rise
and spread of hitherto alien forms of garrison-state organization
in the West. This development appears directly attributable to
existing crisis:
An arena is military when the expectation of violence is high;
civic-when low.55
A continuing crisis, therefore, ensures a continuing trend toward
garrison-state government:
As crisis continues, dominant power increases in both scope
and weight .
The crisis tends to make itself felt in everything that is
done in the situation: the 56more severe the crisis, the closer
the approach to 'total war.'
Extreme symptoms of pathological behavior patterns have
long been observed as characteristic of the totalitarianism of the
Soviet Union. It is noted today, however, that lesser symptoms
of pathological behavior patterns have come to characterize increasing areas of the West. This is a familiar phenomenon to
contemporary political and social science. Political crises, regardless of location, tend to impose a "dim-out on sources and
54. MENDE, WORLu POWER IN THE BALANCE 49-55 (1953). Cf. generally, FRomm,
ESCAPE Thom F EEEom (1941); KOHN, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1950).
55. LASSWELL AND KAPLAN, POWR AND SocIrEY 252 (1950).
'56. Id., 244; cf. generally, KsKER, WOR.D TENSION, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(1951).
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channels of public information.'

57

Connected with this process,

it has been observed, is "a thickening atmosphere of suspicion.I's
In this atmosphere it appears inevitable that the existing political
crisis, as most political crises, should be "complicated by the concurrent reactivation of specific primitive impulses.' ",
When such a state is reached it is high time that a democratic
social order encourage the revival of a tradition of legitimate
controversy and recognize anew the presence in its midst of both
a "loyal" as well as a "disloyal" opposition-even upon such
hallowed grounds as foreign policy.
There is no Hegelian or Marxist "inevitability" about human
events, even those revealed in contemporary trends.
Demoralized or docile men, however, cannot be counted on
to function effectively in the imaginative projection or exploration of policy alternatives in either peace or war in a bipolar
crisis.
A healthy contemporary society should respond with urgent
popular, candid and open debate on "means" and "ends" within
the framework of the crisis at this stage of international affairs.
No such debate, however, is perceptible in the present.06 The ensuing silence is gravely disquieting. It is not broken by F. J. P.
Veale's "contribution" to learning. Even the promise of such a
debate for the near or immediate future appears threadbare:
For lo, the winter is passed, the rain is over and gone, the
flowers appear on the earth, the time of the singing of birds
is come .

and the voice of McCarthy is heard in our land.
There remains the hope that other voices shall be heard in
growing volume.
Richard Arens
Assistant Professor of Law
University of Buffalo.
57.
58.
Cf.
28, 1954,

LASSWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDMDUAL FREEDOM 30 (1950).

Id., 31.
e.g., Mumford, Letter to the New York Times, New York Times, March
Section 4, p. 10E, Col. 6:

[Our] very need for secrecy . . . has produced pathological symptoms
in the whole body-politic: fear, suspicion, non-cooperation, hostility to
see

critical judgment."
59. LASSWELL, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF HAROLD D.
also generally, ALEXANDER, OUR AGE OF UNREASON (1942);

LASSWELL 179 (1951);
RIEs MAN, THE LONELY

(1950); KLUCKHOHN AND MURRAY, PERSONALITY IN NATURE, SOCIETY AND
CULTURE (1953). Cf. KisxER, op. cit. supra note 56.
60. A telling point to the self-same effect has been recently made by Mumford,
note 58 supra, and Kirk, Letter to the New York Times, New York Times, April 2,
CROWD

1954, p. 26, col. 2.

